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Abstract  
The focal point of this thesis is the peacebuilding environment in Nepal following 
the end of the civil war in 2006. A fieldwork investigation was conducted 
focusing on the perceptions of inhabitants of Kathmandu on peace and 
peacebuilding issues using semi-structured interviews. By investigating these 
perceptions the study seeks to answer three main questions: 
• How can the contrasting perspectives on the peace process be understood? 
• Can life in post-conflict Nepal fruitfully be conceptualized as a ”no war, no 
peace”-society, and if so, what are the possible implications of this on the peace 
process?  
• How do people in contemporary Nepal envision sustainable peace?
The thesis draws on theoretical frameworks which are critical of the liberal peace 
- mainly problematizing its tendency to neglect the local context and needs, and 
its reliance on top-down and technocratic measures.     
The conclusion of this thesis is that the contrasting perspectives on the peace 
process can be understood as a consequence of the disjuncture between everyday 
experiences of peacebuilding in Nepal and the top-down perspective of liberal 
peacebuilding actors. Furthermore, the study has found that Nepal can in material 
and political terms be aptly described as a "no war, no peace"-society, yet at the 
same time there appears to be socio-cultural factors which restrain a return to civil 
war. Finally, people in Nepal conceptualize sustainable peace in a manner which 
highlights everyday issues such as material improvements and social inclusion.    
Key words: Peacebuilding, Nepal, Kathmandu, liberal peace, post-liberal peace.   
Words: 9.993
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1. Introduction
Despite the best efforts of myriad peacebuilding actors across the globe since the 
end of the Cold War, the task of creating sustainable peace in post-conflict 
societies has proven immensely challenging. In various contexts, including East 
Timor, Guatemala, Kosovo and Lebanon, international peacebuilding operations 
have failed to produce conditions for sustainable peace (Mac Ginty 2010; 
Richmond 2009). In the wake of peace agreements, these societies continue to 
experience war-like conditions, characterized by low socio-economic 
development and high levels of group animosities, political tensions and 
communal violence (Mac Ginty 2010: 152). This state of affairs is frequently 
mirrored in the lack of  legitimacy that international peacebuilding operations 
enjoy amongst local populations of post-conflict societies, who lament that these 
operations are ”ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and 
conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and 
insensitive” (Richmond 2009: 558).  
Given this rather bleak outlook of many contemporary peacebuilding operations it 
has become commonplace amongst academics to challenge the currently 
dominant formula for peacebuilding, i.e. the liberal peacebuilding model. 
Influential academics such as Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond have made 
it their particular niche to highlight the flaws of the liberal peacebuilding model, 
mainly problematizing its top-down, technocratic, acultural and Western biases, 
and calling for alternative models for building peace which are grounded in the 
everyday needs and experiences of the populations of post-conflict societies 
(Richmond 2009: 579; Mac Ginty 2010: 158).      
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1.1 Research problem
The situation in Nepal following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
2006 appears to follow a similar trajectory as predicted by critics of the liberal 
peacebuilding model. Commentators on the peace process in Nepal have 
increasingly begun to challenge the sustainability and quality of the current peace. 
These critical voices highlight the fact that the majority of the population remain 
entangled in poverty; that the Constituent Assembly (CA) has been chronically 
unable to produce a new constitution; that political life remains highly polarized 
and dysfunctional; that the country is increasingly afflicted with crime, and that 
ultimately the root causes of the conflict remain unresolved (AHRC 2012; New 
York Times; ICTJ 2013).  
The characteristics of contemporary Nepal can thus be said to resemble a ”no war, 
no peace” society – a theoretical framework put forth by Roger Mac Ginty in 
order to conceptualize the unsatisfying realities of many contemporary post-
conflict societies (2008; 2010) 1. Mac Ginty argues that post-conflict societies are 
frequently plagued by ”chronic poverty and underdevelopment, continuing 
violence and deeply dysfunctional inter-group relations” (Mac Ginty 2010: 146). 
At first glance Nepal would appear to fit the bill perfectly for such a society, and 
commentators have indeed described post-conflict Nepal literally as a ”no war, no 
peace”-society (Scoop Independent News; Nepali Times). 
     
At the same time there exists a contrasting perspective on the Nepali peace 
process which is markedly more positive. From this perspective liberal 
peacebuilding in Nepal is portrayed as a success story in the making, where ”the 
transition from war to peace is proceeding quite smoothly and the political 
institutions in the capital city are undergoing significant transformation” (Denskus 
2009: 54). The United Nations (UN) boasts that the peacebuilding efforts have 
1 This theoretical framework will be discussed in closer detail in the theory section below.
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achieved the re-integration of former combatants as well as peaceful democratic 
elections (UN News Centre), while the United States (US) Institute of Peace 
claims that ”the success of the peace process achieved through the 2006 People's 
Movement has been slow but steady" (US Institute of Peace). 
1.2 Research aim and research questions
Reflecting on the different perspectives on the Nepali peace process one cannot 
help but to be perplexed. How can these contrasting perspectives be understood 
and possibly reconciled? The first aim of this thesis is to attempt to find an answer 
to this question. This will be done by comparing the UN's representation of the 
peace process with the perceptions of people living in post-conflict Nepal.      
The second aim of this thesis is to investigate post-conflict Nepal from the 
perspective of the ”no war, no peace”- framework. Is Nepal currently in a 
situation of ”no war, no peace”? Mac Ginty proposes that such societies are in risk 
of civil war recidivism. Is this then an impending prospect for Nepal? What do 
everyday experiences from post-conflict Nepal suggest in this regard? 
The third aim of this thesis is to take up the quest for everyday, post-liberal 
versions of peace in contemporary Nepal, as called for by academics such as Mac 
Ginty and Richmond. The basic aspiration is to grasp how peace is understood by 
people in post-conflict Nepal, and how it relates to their everyday experiences and 
needs.  
Building on the above, the research questions of this thesis are as follows:
 
• How can the contrasting perspectives on the Nepali peace process be 
understood?
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• Can life in post-conflict Nepal fruitfully be conceptualized as a ”no war, no 
peace”-society, and if so, what are the possible implications of this on the peace 
process? 
• How do people in contemporary Nepal envision sustainable peace?
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2. Theory
2.1 On peace
One of the basic assumptions of this thesis is that peace entails more than simply 
the end of direct violence. Peace should instead be treated as a holistic concept 
which should not only address direct violence, but also the underlying structural 
and perceptual causes of conflict2. A failure to address these causes will at best 
produce a fragile ceasefire between former combatants, rather than self-sustaining 
peace (Mac Ginty 2008: 22-24).    
Moreover, I argue that peace can not be defined in a universal manner, as societal 
organization with claims to universality invariably tend to be oppressive to some 
people (Galtung 1996: 7). Instead, peace should be conceived of as context-
dependent processes, which can not be properly understood or achieved outside of 
their particular settings (Mac Ginty 2008: 15-18). 
The most common contemporary version of peace is the liberal peace. In fact, the 
liberal peace framework has become so dominant globally that it is frequently 
labeled hegemonic (Richmond 2010: 667). Rather than adhering to this 
hegemonic form of peace this thesis aims to draw out counter-hegemonic, 
subjectivist, versions of peace. In order to grasp the rationale for this positioning a 
theoretical review of the liberal peace framework and its critics is necessary. 
Following this, an approach to capturing alternative versions of peace will be 
presented.
2 See: Galtung 1969 and 1996, as well as Mac Ginty 2008: 179.
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2.2 The liberal peace
The theoretical origins of what is commonly known as the liberal peace can be 
traced back to Immanuel Kant's essay Perpetual Peace from 1795 which 
envisioned a liberal world order where peace reigned supreme. In Kant's 
conception liberal states were equated with peacefulness, whereas illiberal states 
were thought to be inherently belligerent. Thus liberalism, defined by Kant as 
republicanism with representative government, should be promoted globally in 
order to ensure a peaceful world order (Kant 2010).  
Although Kant did not explicitly refer to the virtues of democracy in Perpetual  
Peace (2010) his legacy has been prominent in the democratic peace theory, 
popularized by Francis Fukuyama in 1993. Following the end of the Cold War, 
Fukuyama claimed that ”the end of history” had arrived, and that liberal 
democracy had proven victorious. Henceforth, he argued, the spread of liberal 
democracy would ensure international peace and security (Fukuyama 1993). 
Peace thereafter became synonymous with liberal democracy, and peacebuilding 
operations were invariably predicated upon a formula of liberalism and 
democracy (Richmond 2008: 87, 91). 
The end of the Cold War and the supposed victory of liberal democracy opened up 
for a new form of liberal intervention in states plagued by conflict and human 
rights violations – i.e. in ”weak states” (Robinson and Aidan 2009: 7-10). In this 
context, issues that had formerly been considered the sole concern of sovereign 
states became viable for international intervention as these matters became linked 
to the international protection of peace and security (Chandler 2004: 66, 74).  
Since the heyday of liberal interventionism in the 1990s, it has arguably lost some 
of its potency and legitimacy (Richmond 2008: 150). Some commentators go so 
far as to claim that liberal interventionism may not yet be dead – but it is currently 
at least in the process of dying (Sandu 2012).  However much liberal 
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interventionism is currently suffering in legitimacy, the liberal model of 
peacebuilding is still widely practiced, and may in fact still be ”the only game in 
town” (Mac Ginty 2011). 
Contemporary liberal peacebuilding operations usually rest on five main legs, 
namely: ”democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized 
markets, and neo-liberal development” (Richmond 2006: 291). As such this has 
come to be considered the standard recipe for contemporary peacebuilding, 
although commentators have suggested that some of the ingredients may in fact 
be incompatible when applied concurrently (Robinson and Aidan 2009: 14).      
2.3 No war, no peace
Roger Mac Ginty takes as his starting point the fact that many contemporary post-
conflict societies are experiencing an uneasy peace characterized by largely the 
same conditions as during the conflict - i.e. ”no war, no peace”-situations. In such 
societies direct violence has been contained, but structural inequalities remain 
ingrained, levels of unemployment and crime are high, group animosities remain 
strong, and there is often a sense of disconnection between the people and the 
government (Mac Ginty 2010: 151). Public optimism following the peace 
agreement is quickly eroded due to the lack of positive improvements. Where 
these issues remain unaddressed, Mac Ginty argues that there is a heightened risk 
for civil war recidivism (Mac Ginty 2008: 80; Mac Ginty 2010: 152).  
Mac Ginty argues that the failures of contemporary peacebuilding operations can 
be traced back to the inherent characteristics of the liberal peacebuilding model, in 
which he identifies several fundamental flaws. First, liberal peacebuilding is a 
top-down approach which has been agreed at the elite level of society. As such, it 
lacks a vital connection to the experiences of the people living in post-conflict 
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societies, for whom peace makes little real difference (Mac Ginty 2010: 157).
 
Secondly, liberal peacebuilding normally embraces neo-liberal economic reforms 
which open up post-conflict societies to the impacts of the global market under 
the premise that this will create development. Mac Ginty argues that this may 
constitute a danger in societies emerging from conflict, as these reforms may 
result in the exacerbation of group tensions (Mac Ginty 2010: 157). 
Thirdly, Mac Ginty notes that the liberal peacebuilding approach is naïvely 
optimistic about the positive impact of democratic elections in post-conflict 
societies. If elections are seen as the endpoint of the democratic process there is a 
risk that the need to cultivate a pluralist political culture in these societies 
becomes neglected. Such a pluralist democratic culture may be necessary in order 
to overcome the root causes of conflict, whereas simply focusing on electoral 
competition between parties might serve to aggravate political tensions within 
post-conflict societies (Mac Ginty 2010: 157). 
Finally, Mac Ginty stresses the problematic aspects of treating the liberal peace as 
a universally applicable model. By deploying the same kind of peacebuilding 
operations in post-conflict societies globally, these operations fail to grasp the 
specificities of the local context, and thereby fail to produce sustainable peace 
(Mac Ginty 2010: 152). 
Having said that, Mac Ginty does also acknowledge the positive impacts of ”no 
war, no peace”-situations, most importantly the fact that organized violence has 
been contained. However, the author stresses that one should demand more from 
peacebuilding operations, including addressing ”structural factors that underpin 
conflict, indirect violence and affective issues such as reconciliation” (Mac Ginty 
2010: 159). Without addressing these issues, contemporary liberal peacebuilding 
operations are destined to continue producing ”no war, no peace”-situations.
Mac Ginty notes that there is frequently a steep disjuncture between what is 
formally acknowledged as peace and what inhabitants of post-conflict societies 
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actually need and expect from said peace. By encouraging the populations of post-
conflict societies to “imagine peace”, one might grasp how this disjuncture could 
be overcome, and thus how one might be able to create better peace policy in 
these societies (Mac Ginty 2008: 97-98).
Moreover, Mac Ginty stresses the importance of identifying conflict recidivism 
factors in post-conflict societies. The author notes that perhaps the most important 
factor in restraining a return to conflict is ”demonstrable signs that the peace 
accord environment offers greater advantages than war” (Mac Ginty 2008: 105). 
This could for example manifest itself in political institutions that are able to serve 
basic public needs in a manner perceived as efficient and equitable (ibid: 105). 
Mac Ginty also notes that conflict-restraining factors may sometimes have ”a 
subtle quality deeply embedded within social and cultural norms” (ibid: 107) and 
that therefore these factors may not always be immediately visible to the observer. 
Nonetheless, he argues that it is essential to identify and build on these factors in 
order to guard against civil war recidivism (ibid: 107). 
2.4 Post-liberal peace
Oliver Richmond's conception of post-liberal peace takes as its starting point the 
failure of contemporary liberal peacebuilding operations to create sustainable 
peace. As such it builds on many of the same critiques as those of Roger Mac 
Ginty. However, Richmond provides additional insights that are worthy of 
elaboration, as we shall see below. 
In order to follow Richmond's main arguments one needs to briefly examine his 
conception of the three graduations of liberal peacebuilding. The conservative  
graduation focuses on establishing hard security. This entails a top-down, 
frequently externalized, approach to building peace which offers basic security 
but no engagement with everyday dimensions of peace. The orthodox graduation 
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focuses mainly on institution-building, placing its emphasis on developing the 
institutions of the liberal state as well as the market economy. Although the 
orthodox graduation does suggest a commitment to everyday dimensions of peace 
through its liberal rights-based approach, the main focus remains top-down and 
institutional. Finally, the emancipatory graduation is a bottom-up approach with a 
significant focus on local ownership and needs. This graduation offers a strong 
commitment to everyday issues such as social justice and welfare provision, as its 
main focal point is the needs of the local populations (Richmond 2009: 560-561).
In theory the graduations of the liberal peace can be thought of as a sequenced 
approach to peacebuilding, where the conservative moves through the orthodox to 
the emancipatory (Richmond 2009: 568). As such, the emancipatory peace can be 
seen as the endpoint of liberal peacebuilding, and has also frequently come to 
serve as the legitimation for the conservative and orthodox graduations (ibid: 560, 
562). However, Richmond observes that despite liberal peacebuilding's theoretical 
ambition to build an emancipatory peace, contemporary liberal peacebuilding 
operations tend in practice to be "stuck" in the conservative and orthodox 
graduations (Richmond 2009: 569; Richmond 2006: 303).
Richmond links this problem to the ontological foundation of the liberal 
peacebuilding model. He notes that the liberal peace rests on a Westphalian logic3, 
and that therefore the liberal peace tends to prioritize approaches which seek to 
contain inter-state conflict through institutional top-down measures, rather than 
approaches that address socio-economic grievances within states (Richmond 
2009: 568, 569).  
Moreover, due to its focus on political rights the liberal peace may be stifled from 
becoming a truly emancipatory peace, Richmond argues. This is the case as 
political rights are considered the pinnacle of the social contract in the liberal 
conception of the state. However, in many post-conflict societies everyday needs 
may be related to other issues, such as material gains (Richmond 2009: 568, 569). 
3 I.e. the establishment and perpetuation of the modern state system.
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Furthermore, Richmond is critical of the possibility of creating peace policy that 
could be universally applicable. Instead, he emphasizes the inherent plurality of 
post-conflict societies and the importance of protecting difference in the face of 
the often homogenizing influences of liberal approaches (Richmond 2009: 568). 
Given the above, how does Richmond envision peacebuilding in practice? The 
answer arguably lies in broadening the grasp of peacebuilding operations to move 
”beyond Westphalia” (Richmond 2009: 569) by incorporating the dimensions of 
the everyday. Such a broadened grasp would complement the ”cold 
institutionalism” (ibid: 574) of liberal peacebuilding with a focus on everyday 
needs in post-conflict societies. By doing so, Richmond argues that peacebuilding 
can regain some of its lost legitimacy amongst local populations, which in turn 
would render peacebuilding operations better equipped at building truly 
sustainable and emancipatory peace where ”individuals and communities have 
primacy over states in terms of their rights, freedoms, and participation” (ibid: 
577).        
The focus on everyday needs in peacebuilding could for example entail the 
provision of ”jobs, welfare, education, and social justice as well as security” 
(Richmond 2009: 580). However, given the innate plurality of post-conflict 
societies Richmond is wary of suggesting a universally applicable ”blueprint”4 for 
reaching sustainable post-liberal peace (ibid: 579). Instead, Richmond outlines 
what he considers the appropriate methods for reaching this end – calling for a 
methodological re-positioning of the liberal peace where participatory, 
empathetic, methods are increasingly favored over institutional ones. In practice, 
Richmond suggests that "discourse analysis and ethnography allows for greater, 
and more culturally appropriate, access to everyday life” (ibid: 570). 
Although Richmond warns that "predatory institutional frameworks" (Richmond 
2009: 568) often come "at the expense of everyday life" (ibid: 568) he does not 
categorically reject the notion that institutions can play a positive role in 
peacebuilding. However, he stresses that these must be grounded in an in-depth 
4 See: Richmond 2012.
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understanding of their role in the local context, and should be flexible and 
sensitive to everyday needs in order not to become oppressive (ibid: 576, 579). 
The practical implications of this is that peacebuilding actors should engage in 
reciprocal, continuous, dialogue with people of the local contexts about ”how 
institutions and their creation or development affect the individual, communities, 
and society” (ibid: 570). 
Finally, Richmond highlights the importance of local agency in peacebuilding 
operations in order to assure genuine ”self-government and self-determination” 
(Richmond 2009: 571). To this end, he suggests that perhaps the most suitable 
role for international peacebuilders is a facilitative one; providing support for 
peace initiatives that are ultimately the product of local agency and consensus, 
while avoiding taking on an overly directive role (Richmond 2009: 579; 
Richmond 2010: 691).
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3. Methods and Methodology
3.1 Epistemology
In the present study the focus lies on subjective perceptions of people in Nepal – a 
focus which fits well with the overarching research aims of the thesis. By 
focusing on subjective perceptions, this thesis adopts a constructivist 
epistemology, where claims to "objective social reality" are rejected  in favor of 
subjective world-views, perceptions and beliefs (Young and Collin 2004). As 
such, the generated data of this study should be seen as individual mental 
representations, rather than necessarily factual encounters of an objective reality 
(Heath et al 2009: 89). Given what this study pertains to achieve, i.e. the 
understanding of subjective perceptions on given issues, the notion of data as  
representation should not pose any significant problems for the credibility5 of the 
study (ibid: 88-89).
By focusing on subjective perceptions one might gain insights into the contrasting 
perspectives on the peace process in Nepal. If there is, as Mac Ginty argues6, a 
systemic disjuncture between the official and the everyday experiences of the 
liberal peacebuilding project, this will be uncovered by comparing the perceptions 
of people in Nepal with the official discourses of peacebuilding actors. Moreover, 
by documenting perceptions of people in Nepal the researcher will glean an 
understanding of the dynamics that keep conflicts active at an everyday level 
(Mac Ginty 2008: 80; Nordstrom and Martin 1992: 14). As such, the focus on 
5 Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest “credibility” as an appropriate manner to conceptualize internal validity in 
qualitative research.
6 As discussed in section 2.3.
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perceptions will provide the researcher with a bottom-up understanding of the 
current state of the peacebuilding process, as well as possible insights into its 
future.     
Finally, the documentation of perceptions will help provide an understanding of 
how people in contemporary Nepal understand and envision sustainable peace. 
This is an intrinsically subjective experience which is rarely, if ever, found in 
official representations of the peacebuilding process. These perspectives may vary 
significantly from the dominant ones, and may thus help provide a more 
comprehensive take on these issues (Mac Ginty 2008: 98).  
3.2 Empirical material
The main empirical material of this thesis is derived from a field study that was 
conducted in Kathmandu in April and May of 2013. In total, I spent 31 days in 
Kathmandu for this purpose. During the field study I conducted 11 semi-
structured interviews with interlocutors from various sectors of Kathmandu 
society. These interviews, short of one, were recorded and then selectively 
transcribed7. The main rationale for conducting fieldwork in Nepal was, 
essentially, that the perspectives of ordinary citizens of Nepal are not readily 
available in mainstream media and academia.
In addition to the interviews this thesis draws on the analysis of secondary sources 
such as UN reports and statements, reports from non governmental organizations 
(NGOs), newspaper articles, academic texts, and policy documents. 
7 The interview recordings are available for review upon request.
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3.3 Semi-structured interviews
In order to capture the perceptions of people in Nepal I relied on the semi-
structured interview format. The semi-structured interview is a qualitative 
hermeneutic research method which aims to capture the personal world-views, 
attitudes and beliefs of the interlocutor. By inquiring into a number of pre-
specified themes in each interview this method enabled me to probe deeply into 
the subjective world-views of the interlocutors (Bryman 2008: 439). The themes 
that were covered in the interviews were derived from the theoretical frameworks 
that underpin this study, which were then formalized in an interview guide that 
was prepared before coming to Kathmandu (Bryman et al 2004: 519) 8.  
Included in the interview guide is a brief positioning of myself as a researcher, my 
professional and personal background, as well as a short statement on what my 
research pertains to achieve, which I shared with the interlocutors at each 
interview occasion. This was done in order to conduct research which is as 
transparent, reflexive, and reciprocal as possible. Moreover, I argue that it is 
important to share the research aims with the interlocutors because it will, in this 
case, produce higher quality and more realistic results. Explaining to the 
interlocutors that I am not seeking to find official discourses or "the right 
answers", but rather that my interest lies in subjective perceptions likely enabled 
the interlocutors to feel more relaxed and prone to sharing their particular world-
views during the interviews9. I also told the interlocutors that they could be 
anonymous in the study, so as to ensure that they would not feel hesitant to speak 
out on sensitive issues.   
The questions that were asked during the interviews were not specified 
beforehand, and were intentionally kept as open as possible in order to allow the 
ideas and interests of the interlocutors to come out freely without too much 
guidance (DiCiccio & Crabtree 2006: 316). At the end of the interviews, if issues 
needed to be clarified or elaborated upon, more specific questions and prompts 
8 The interview guide is attached as Annex 1 to this thesis. 
9 This is also argued by Björnehed (2012).
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were used (ibid: 316).    
The interviews were conducted in English, except in one case where a translator 
translated between English and Nepali.   
3.4 Sampling
As one of the main aims of this study is to understand different perceptions and 
experiences of peacebuilding and everyday life in post-conflict Nepal, I strove to 
interview people from diverse socio-economic, political, religious, gender as well 
as caste backgrounds. 
Moreover, I strove to interview as many people as needed in order to reach 
theoretical saturation. The concept of theoretical saturation refers, simply put, to 
the stage of interviewing when no new relevant data is produced from conducting 
new interviews (Bryman et al 2004: 416). Working according to this logic, I kept 
interviewing for as long as it provided me with new relevant information. As I 
was conducting the final interviews however, I realized that the gist of the 
information conveyed had already been covered in previous interviews. Thus, I 
concluded that theoretical saturation had been reached, and did not pursue more 
interviews.
With regards to sampling in practice, I relied at first on a local connection who 
helped me find suitable people for the research. As time passed and I conducted 
more interviews, I also came to rely slightly on snowball sampling; basically 
asking interlocutors if they knew somebody who could be interested in being 
interviewed for the research project (Corbetta 2003: 268).
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3.5 The parts and the whole
The initial research motivation for this thesis began with the identification of an 
empirically puzzling observation, i.e. the contrasting perspectives on the Nepali 
peace process. How could this be understood? From this initial question, 
theoretical frameworks were identified that might help explain the contrasting 
perspectives. A deeper review of these theoretical frameworks then spawned the 
identification of further research venues, which came to form the basis for 
research questions two and three.
 
Although the research aims and the questions of this thesis were to a certain 
extent theoretically constructed, the empirical material that was collected in the 
field came to have a strong bearing on the theoretical elements that were deemed 
relevant to include in this thesis. At the same time, the theoretical frameworks 
conferred analytical value on the empirical material, and thus to a certain extent 
guided the identification of empirically relevant material. As such, one could 
conceive of the theoretical-empirical relationship in this thesis as a hermeneutic 
circle (Debesay et al 2008: 58) 10, where theoretical assumptions and empirical 
material influenced each other in a continuous dialogue throughout the research 
process. In this tactile back-and-forth dialogue between the different parts of the 
text, meaning gradually developed which came to form the analysis section of this 
thesis. 
It is however important to note that the analysis may never be entirely finalized in 
the hermeneutic circle, but should instead be seen as an ever-evolving process 
(Debesay et al 2008: 65). Despite this state of affairs, at some point the researcher 
has to decide that the analysis is “finished enough” to be a credible representation 
of the whole. After several loops in the hermeneutic circle, I argue that this was 
eventually achieved in this thesis.                         
10 Or as some would prefer: a hermeneutic spiral. See: Nåden (2010).
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3.6 Limitations
The most fundamental limitation of this study is its limited transferability11. Due 
to a number of methodological factors, such as the sampling procedures and 
number of interlocutors, this research is not intended to be transferable to cover 
larger populations in or beyond Nepal. Nonetheless, the study has provided 
significant insights into the research issues at hand, and should be treated as a 
preliminary study. As such it would benefit from being complemented by further 
and more extensive studies.  
Moreover, the study would have gained from including an extended 
methodological discussion on research reflexivity, where the position of the 
researcher in relation to the field of study was highlighted and problematized12. 
However, due to space limitations such a discussion had to be excluded from the 
final text.   
  
Finally, it is reasonable to reflect on the fact that the study was conducted in 
Nepal while the researcher is a native Swede. Thus, one might conceive of a 
multitude of socio-cultural misunderstandings between researcher and interlocutor 
that could potentially obscure the findings of this thesis13. This problem was 
however mitigated by the fact that I spent six months working in Kathmandu in 
2010, and in doing so I acquired a basic understanding of the socio-cultural 
context. These six months may not have translated into perfect cultural know-
how, but at least it enabled me to avoid some of the basic mistakes that novice 
foreign researchers may otherwise make. 
11 Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest “transferability” as an appropriate manner to conceptualize external validity in 
qualitative research.
12 See for example Aull Davies (2002) for an interesting discussion on research reflexivity and fieldwork. 
13 See for example: Debesay et al 2008:61.
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4. Background
4.1 Nepal – a brief political history
What is today known as Nepal came into being as a unitary kingdom in 1796 
when King Prithvi Narayan, backed by an army led by members of the Hindu 
warrior caste Chhettris, united the country. Before the unification of Nepal, its 
territory was comprised of small independent principalities (Von Einsiedel et al 
2012: 5).
The unified Nepal was a highly diverse kingdom comprising a vast number of 
ethnic, caste, tribal and linguistic groups. Nepal was from its inception 
administered in a top-down manner by the powerful elite close to the king; an 
elite stemming almost exclusively from the Hindu caste and speaking Nepali. 
Thus, despite the diversity within Nepal the ruling institutions of the kingdom 
came to be associated with a single religion, i.e. Hinduism, and a single language, 
i.e. Nepali (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 6-7). 
In 1846 the Rana autocracy came to power through a coup d'etat. It established a 
form of autocratic rule embodied in the prime minister position, where the king 
retained his position in theory but in practice was stripped of all power. The Rana 
autocracy introduced the Muluki Ain (Civil Code) of Nepal, which codified the 
Hindu caste system and incorporated all groups residing within the borders of 
Nepal, no matter if they were Hindu or not. A form of institutionalized 
discrimination was thereby established which left large parts of the population 
23
legally marginalized. It was not until 1963 that the official state sanction of the 
caste system was revoked from the Muluki Ain - however, by that time these 
social structures were already deeply embedded in Nepali society (Von Einsiedel 
et al 2012: 43). 
In 1951, as a consequence of mounting popular pressure, the Ranas were 
compelled to stand down from power. During the following years political parties 
of all convictions thrived in Nepal, and in 1959 the first general elections were 
held. However, in 1960 King Mahendra, backed by the army, seized power and 
banned all political parties and introduced in its place the so called Panchayat 
system, i.e. a party-less system of governance where the power was concentrated 
in the hands of the king and his closest advisers (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 40).
The Panchayat system was upheld until 1990 when the popular uprising known as 
Jana Andolan14 demanded that King Biyendra abolish the Panchayat system and 
introduce a constitutional monarchy with multi-party parliamentary democracy. 
The main demands of the movements were incorporated in the new constitution of 
1990. However, as a compromise with the king and the military, the constitution 
confirmed Nepal as a Hindu state and the king as the supreme commander of the 
army (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 7). 
The multi-party democratic system that came into being in 1991 did open up the 
political space in Nepal for marginalized groups to push for their rights, although 
the governments during these years generally failed to address their grievances. 
Moreover, the governments between 1991-1996 were all short-lived, and failed to 
provide necessary stability to the political system (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 7). It 
was in this context that the Maoist insurgency found widespread popular support.
14 Literally translated as "The People's Movement".
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4.2 The Maoist insurgency of 1996 - 2006
The Maoist insurgency should be understood against the backdrop of the Jana 
Andolan. This movement paved the way for the re-introduction of political parties 
in Nepal, and thereby legitimized the Maoists, who up until that point had merely 
been an underground movement. Following the popular uprising of 1990 the 
Maoist movement was able to participate as a political party in the new multi-
party system under the name United People's Front (UPF) (Bohara et al 2011: 
887).
The Jana Andolan however did not prove to be quite as groundbreaking as many 
had hoped it would be. In fact, most commentators argue that the democratic 
reforms introduced in the wake of the popular uprising were merely a mirage for 
most of the population of Nepal. The majority of the citizens still remained in 
abject poverty and lacked any real political influence, as political parties largely 
pursued the interests of the Hindu upper castes (Bohara et al 2011: 887) 15.  
The Maoist found mobilizing ground in the structural inequality, poverty, and lack 
of political influence of the ordinary Nepali citizen. On February 13, 1996 the 
Maoist splinter division Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) ignited The 
People's War by attacking a police station in the hill district Rolpa in Western 
Nepal (Bohara et al 2011: 887-888; Uppsala Conflict Database: Nepal). The 
attack provoked heavyhanded retribution by the police, which in turn fed the 
popular support for the Maoists, thus enabling the insurgency to recruit members 
more easily (Bohara et al 2011: 887-888). 
The civil war lasted for 10 years, during which time approximately 13.000 people 
lost their lives. The Maoist insurgents deployed guerilla tactics and targeted 
government officials, police officers and public infrastructure, and managed to 
seize control of large areas of the country. The stated objectives of the insurgency 
15 The caste system in Nepal is highly complex, and intersects with other social identities and structures. This thesis 
will not dwell further on this matter, but those interested may consult Subedi (2010) for an introduction to caste in 
Nepal.
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were to abolish monarchy, establish a people's republic and elect a CA which 
would draft a new constitution for Nepal (Quy-Toan and Iyer 2010: 736). As 
mentioned above, the root causes of the conflict have invariably been identified as 
endemic poverty combined with vast inequalities between different groups in 
Nepal, i.e. "horizontal inequality" (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 8-17; NOREF 2013: 
3).
In 2006, reacting to a royalist seizure of power in 2005, a popular movement 
known as Jana Andolan II paved the way for the abolition of the monarchy, the 
reinstatement of multi-party rule and eventually the signing of the CPA between 
the government and the CPN-M, who had reached a mutually hurting stalemate in 
the conflict (Surkhe 2009: 8, 33). Amongst its most important achievements, the 
CPA formalized a permanent ceasefire between the parties; tasked the UN with 
overseeing the disarmament of certain cantonments; provided for elections of a 
CA, an interim constitution, interim legislature and government, and suspended 
the monarchy until the constituent assembly decide further on its role (Uppsala 
Conflict Database: Nepal).
4.3 Post-conflict era
Following the signing of the CPA on November 21, 2006 Nepal entered into its 
post-conflict phase, in which the main challenges would be to implement the 
points of the peace agreement and build sustainable peace. 
Although the actual peacemaking process was largely a Nepali achievement16, the 
subsequent peacebuilding phase has involved the international community to a 
larger extent. Perhaps most notably, the UN came to occupy a central role in this 
delicate phase through the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) which was 
established in early 2007. UNMIN was tasked with three broad components, 
16 Albeit with some degree of foreign influences. See Van Einseidel et al (2012) chapter 6 for an elaboration on this 
topic. 
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namely: monitoring of arms and armies; support of the CA election, and 
assistance for monitoring the peace process at the local level (UNMIN; Von 
Einsiedel et al 2012: 207). The UN mission was the deliberate creation of the 
former conflict parties, and was as such enshrined in the CPA (Uppsala Conflict 
Database: Nepal).  
In addition to the creation of UNMIN, the CPA also stipulated the continued 
presence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
which had been active in Nepal since 2005 (Surkhe 2009: 15). The mandate of the 
OHCHR was to independently monitor and report on the human rights situation in 
Nepal (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 181-183). 
Both the UNMIN and OHCHR offices in Nepal were closed down in 2011. The 
former closed as a consequence of a UN Security Council decision, and the latter 
as the Nepal government did not renew its mandate (Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 
228). However, the UN still remains in Nepal through the work of its other 
programs, such as for example the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). 
The UNDP  has been active in Nepal since 1963 and has mainly been focusing on 
combating poverty through capacity building of government agencies, civil 
society and community groups (UNDP Nepal). In addition to its work on reducing 
poverty, the UNDP also has a strong focus on enhancing the rule of law as well as 
promoting and strengthening human rights. Moreover, since the end of the 
conflict in 2006 the UNDP has a specific program on peacebuilding which takes 
up about 20 percent of its annual budget (UNDP Nepal Annual Report 2013: 52). 
Aside from these UN agencies myriad organizations and agencies, both local and 
international, have proliferated in the peacebuilding efforts following the CPA. It 
is however beyond the grasp of this thesis to cover all of these organizations and 
activities17.     
17 For an overview of some of the organizations and agencies that are active in peacebuilding in contemporary Nepal, 
see: Insight on Conflict: Peacebuilding Organizations. 
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Finally, it is relevant to note that the international peacebuilding operations in 
Nepal can be characterized as a ”light footprint” approach, where local ownership 
of the peace process has remained high, and Nepali politicians have to a large 
extent dictated the level of acceptable influence of international actors (Surkhe 
2009; Von Einsiedel et al 2012: 201-231).
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5. Main findings and analysis
5.1 How can the contrasting perspectives on the 
Nepali peace process be understood?
As described in the introduction of this thesis, the Nepali peace process is 
frequently portrayed in highly contrasting terms. On the one hand it is described 
as a liberal peace success story in the making, and on the other hand as a failure 
which has created an unsustainable and poor quality peace. How can these 
contrasting perspectives be understood?
As suggested by academics such as Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, part 
of the explanation might be found in the disjuncture between the top-down 
perspective of the liberal peacebuilding model and the bottom-up perspective of 
everyday experiences of life in Nepal. Let us investigate this notion further by 
looking closer at these perspectives to see whether the contrast might stem from 
here.
5.1.1 Liberal top-down peacebuilding
In this section the focus will be on how the UN has been portraying the 
peacebuilding process in Nepal. The UN is taken as the case example as it has 
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been one of the most salient peacebuilding actors in Nepal, as well as an 
international actor which is frequently associated with top-down and technocratic 
approaches to peacebuilding18.      
On June 29, 2012 the UN pledged an additional 8 million USD in funding for the 
UN Peace Fund for Nepal19. In a press release from the UN News Centre 
announcing the sustained funding, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in 
Nepal Robert Piper described the peacebuilding process in the following terms:
There have been important achievements in the peace process to date, including the 
completion of the discharge and integration process of the ex-Maoist army, the successful 
and largely peaceful elections in 2008,  the removal of all minefields, and a smooth 
transition to a Republic (UN News Centre). 
In the same press statement Mr. Piper discussed the remaining challenges of the 
peace process, focusing mainly on the missed deadline for the creation of a new 
constitution and the dissolution of the CA that followed (UN News Centre). 
In a similar vein, UNDP Nepal's Annual Report of 2013 identifies Nepal's primary 
remaining challenge as the creation of a "democratic and inclusive constitution 
that is acceptable to all sections of society" (UNDP Nepal Annual Report 2013: 
2). The report proceeds by highlighting the significant contribution of UNDP in 
the continuing struggle to achieve such a constitution: "UNDP’s support to 
electoral reform contributed to making the 2013 elections inclusive, fair and 
peaceful" (ibid: 2).        
These examples are largely representative of the manner in which the peace 
process in Nepal is portrayed by the UN – i.e. as a mainly successful enterprise 
with several important achievement to date, albeit with some challenges still 
ahead. These challenges are however often presented in technical terms, e.g. that 
the work on the constitution must be resumed and finalized. In a similar fashion, 
the UN's representation of the hitherto "success" of the peace process is mainly 
18 See: Richmond 2009: 560-561.
19 The UN Peace Fund for Nepal is a coordinating UN body which directs resources for activities of clear relevance to 
the peace process. As such, it does not implement any projects of its own. 
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focusing on technical achievements, e.g. the discharge of combatants from 
cantonments and the carrying out of free and fair elections. According to this 
logic, the success of the peacebuilding process becomes a matter of ticking off 
boxes on a checklist which will eventually be exhausted, after which the peace 
process will be considered complete. 
Interestingly, the aforementioned UN press statement of June 29, 2012 does 
mention the medium and long- term importance of addressing the structural 
causes of the conflict in Nepal: "Nepal will also require investment for medium- 
and long-term initiatives to address the underlying causes of the conflict" (UN 
News Centre).  This indicates that the UN conceives of peacebuilding in Nepal as 
a sequential process20, where addressing the root causes of the conflict is a task 
that is considered relevant only in the medium to long term. Accordingly, it is not 
considered a fundamental problem that the root causes of the conflict are left 
largely unaddressed in the first wave of the peacebuilding process, as they will 
supposedly be addressed later on. This kind of sequenced approach to 
peacebuilding might help account for the different evaluations of the 
peacebuilding process in Nepal.      
Let us now proceed by examining the everyday dynamics of peace in Nepal, to 
see how that may enrich our understanding of the issue further. 
5.1.2 Everyday dynamics of peace in Nepal
During the field study in Kathmandu I frequently came across the conception that 
the everyday situation for most people had deteriorated since the end of the 
conflict. Interlocutors explained that prices of food, water, fuel, housing and 
electricity had risen radically since the end of the conflict, and that unemployment 
was becoming more and more widespread. There was a common opinion that 
more time had to be spent on securing the basic necessities of everyday life, and 
20 See: Richmond 2009: 568
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that there was little, if any, time for focusing on social activities, and even less so 
on engaging in politics. This notion was vividly expressed by a male interlocutor, 
a tour organizer for the tourist industry and a father of two:
People in Kathmandu today are only thinking about how to survive, what to eat in the 
evening, what to eat in the morning, when to go to the office […]. This is the main 
problem; if they had enough resources then they could think about the political situation, 
about the government, and about the country (Interview 1).        
This opinion can be seen as indicative of the disjuncture between the technocratic 
problem-solving approach of peacebuilding agencies such as the UN, and the 
everyday dynamics of life in post-conflict Nepal. Given this disjuncture 
peacebuilding agencies can proclaim successes when certain objective criteria 
have been met, such as the completion of the integration process of former 
combatants, while at the same time most people perceive their everyday situation 
to have gotten worse since the peace agreement was signed. These two realities 
can thus exist side by side, and thereby produce highly contrasting perspectives on 
the progress of the peace process. 
A second common theme that was found when conducting interviews in 
Kathmandu was the perception that the national political system is dysfunctional. 
Nepali politicians were frequently portrayed as greedy, corrupt, self-serving, and 
unwilling to compromise. According to most interlocutors there is a lack of a 
common sense of purpose amongst national politicians who generally are not seen 
to be working for the interests of Nepal as a whole. The notion of the self-serving 
politician was conveyed by, among others, a male interlocutor who works as a 
teacher at a secondary school in Budhanilkantha, Kathmandu:
Value based politics is becoming eradicated from the country […]. Instead it is replaced  
by selfish politics. If they find any benefits from the politics, leaders do that, whether 
this is ethically correct or not (Interview 6). 
 
The fact that the national political system is perceived to be fundamentally flawed 
is likely to influence the way that people in Nepal appreciate the progress of the 
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peacebuilding process. From the perspective of lived experience in Nepal, it 
matters little that the UN has helped organize democratic elections if said 
elections only produce politicians who are self-serving and corrupt, and in effect 
perpetuate Nepal as a highly unequal and poverty-ridden society.
A third salient theme that came up during the fieldwork was the perceived failure 
of international agencies working in development and peacebuilding in the 
country. There was a commonly held attitude amongst the interlocutors that these 
international agencies are failing to make a difference due to a lack of 
understanding of the local context, an urban bias, national vested interests, as well 
as an unwillingness to incorporate local people and resources in the process. A 
male teacher in Bansbari, Kathmandu expressed his frustration with the work of 
international agencies in the following manner: 
They don't like to go to the rural areas […]. You are going to conduct a program in the 
rural area, but still you are not thinking about the participation of the local people […]. 
Public participation should be more [...] the local area, the local people, local resources 
should be utilized to the optimum level (Interview 2). 
When prompted about how international agencies might make a better 
contribution to Nepal, the interlocutor replied: 
INGOs are somehow always working for their own nations first and then secondly they 
are working for Nepal […]. Whenever you have come to help Nepal, see that the 
Nepalese are helped […]. If your vision is not clear, then you will not do anything – and 
that is happening in Nepal (Interview 2).
The above is indicative of the failure of international agencies to properly 
understand and connect with the local context, thereby creating projects that do 
not resonate well with local needs and circumstances. As such, these projects will 
invariably be considered failures from the local perspectives, whereas 
international agencies are likely to add them to their list of achievements.  
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5.1.3 Concluding discussion
In the above, we find a number of themes that can help explain the contrasting 
perspectives on the Nepali peace process. To a large extent the above confirms the 
common critique of the liberal peacebuilding model, problematizing its 
technocratic, top-down and problem-solving approach to building peace, as well 
as its inability to properly understand and adapt to the realities of everyday life in 
post-conflict societies. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the UN has adopted an emancipatory 
rhetoric on peacebuilding21, which is clear in its reference to addressing the root 
causes of the conflict. However, this is only considered a priority in the medium 
and long term, which confirms that the UN peacebuilding operations in Nepal so 
far follows the standard trajectory of liberal peacebuilding, where emancipatory 
peace is considered an option only in the final stages, after already having 
engaged in extensive security and state-building operations. 
Given the fact that many of the interlocutors of this study expressed a deep 
dissatisfaction with the work of peacebuilding and development agencies, as well 
as with the socio-economic and political conditions of their everyday lives, one 
might question whether this has in fact been the most appropriate approach to 
peacebuilding in Nepal. Instead, one might have had adopted an approach where 
the everyday dimensions of  peace, such as for example the widespread poverty 
and inequality, were addressed simultaneously and with equal weight as security 
and state-building issues at the first stages of the process. I suggest that this post-
liberal approach22 to peacebuilding would have resonated better with the needs 
and experiences of the interlocutors of this study. 
21 See: Richmond 2009: 561.
22 See: Richmond 2007: 577, 574.
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5.2 Can life in post-conflict Nepal fruitfully be 
conceptualized as a "no war, no peace"-society, and 
if so, what are the possible implications of this on 
the peace process?
In this section I will elaborate on the everyday dimensions of life in post-conflict 
Nepal to assess the extent to which Nepal can be described as a ”no war, no 
peace”-society. Following this I will attempt to identify some of the possible 
implications of this for the future of the peacebuilding process. 
5.2.1 Everyday life in Nepal as "no war, no peace"
As already noted in section 5.1.2 it is clear from the interviews that everyday life 
in Kathmandu has gotten more strenuous since the end of the conflict, and that the 
national political situation is considered dysfunctional. Political parties are seen as 
unable to cooperate in a democratic manner, and therefore as a source of constant 
political instability. This notion was articulated by, among others, a female lawyer 
interlocutor of Lazimpat, Kathmandu: ”Since the peace agreement there has been 
so many leaderships of Nepal [...] there is no political stability [...] the parties do 
not trust each other” (Interview 4). Moreover, since the peace agreement of 2006, 
Nepal has been increasingly troubled by organized crime, in particular in the Terai 
region of the country (AHRC 2010; Surkhe 2009). 
Furthermore, the service delivery of Nepal's public institutions to its citizens was 
overwhelmingly seen as faltering by the interlocutors of this study. A student 
interlocutor used the example of how passports are issued in Nepal to illustrate 
this point: 
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If you pay 5.000 you get your passport in 45 days, if you pay 10.000 you get your 
passport in two weeks, if you are ready to pay 15.000 you get it in 48 hours [...] the 
government is just doing business in Nepal instead of serving the people (Interview 10).
Adding the above factors together it is fairly uncontroversial to argue that Nepal 
can be conceived of as a ”no war, no peace”-society. Does this entail that Nepal is 
currently on the brink of a return to civil war? I argue that this claim is dubious, as 
we shall see below in a discussion which highlights subtle factors that are ”deeply 
embedded within social and cultural norms” (Mac Ginty 2008: 107) and which 
may serve as a restraint to civil war recidivism.
5.2.2 Popular agency and the demise of existential fear
One of the main insights that was gained from conducting interviews in Nepal is 
that although certain dimensions of life in Kathmandu, such as the material and 
political, remain the same or have even deteriorated since the end of the conflict, 
other dimensions have in fact radically changed. 
Most notably, people are no longer experiencing existential fear as they were 
during the conflict. As noted by an interlocutor: "during the conflict nobody went 
anywhere, they were always scared, they were always worried when the news 
came and they heard how many people died in the conflict“ (Interview 4). In fact, 
most of the people that I interviewed had somehow been influenced by the 
violence of the conflict – either from a direct encounter with Maoist insurgents, 
having friends or family killed, or simply by being constrained by constant police 
surveillance. As expressed by an interlocutor: ”in the wartime we could not go 
anywhere, and there were always police checking you” (Interview 1). These 
conflict-related fears have now been mostly eradicated from Nepali society, 
according to the interlocutors that I spoke to. 
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The implications of the above appear to be far-reaching. As people are no longer 
experiencing existential fear a new freedom is found in life in Kathmandu - one 
that enables people to move about at will and to re-engage politically. As 
expressed by an interlocutor, a male youth leader of a political party: ”Before the 
peace process it was totally dark – but now it is light. People have achieved some 
kind of awareness […] now they are fearless” (Interview 3).     
Although the people that I interviewed were all mostly discontent with the current 
political situation, there was simultaneously a strong sense of agency for political 
change amongst many of them. The following statement from an interlocutor is 
indicative of this: ”Nepali politicians must change! Otherwise, as the new 
generation has come, they may remove them all” (Interview 6). Thus, it appears 
that the end of the conflict has empowered people to regain a sense of freedom 
and political agency, and opened up for the resumption of political awareness and 
action. 
The political reawakening after the conflict should not only be understood as a 
freedom from existential fear, but should also be seen against the backdrop of 
recent Nepali political events, where people's movements have managed to 
remove the authoritative power of the king in favor of democratic government on 
no less than two occasions in the past two decades.
5.2.3 Concluding discussion
Most interlocutors confirmed that life in contemporary Kathmandu is indeed 
characterized by many of the defining conditions of a “no war, no peace”-society, 
i.e. poverty, political turbulence, widespread inequality, high levels of crime and 
unemployment, and unsatisfying service delivery. These are some of the same 
conditions that have frequently been identified as the root causes of the civil war 
in Nepal. From this, one might conclude that the risk for civil war recidivism is 
37
palpable.
Significantly however, the interlocutors that I spoke to generally exhibited a 
strong belief in the agency of the Nepali people to change the political situation, 
should that prove necessary. These voices signaled confidence in democratic 
governance, and hope in the younger generations of politicians who are currently 
in the process of replacing the old garde of politicians. Public optimism about the 
democratic and peaceful future of Nepal appears to be strong, despite the adverse 
conditions of political and everyday life. I argue that these ”subtle factors” 23 are 
likely to have a restraining influence on civil war recidivism, to a certain extent 
even in the face of the root causes of the conflict remaining unaddressed.  
Having said that, it is important to note that civil war recidivism is influenced by a 
multitude of factors, and that the above may not necessarily be the compelling 
factor that restrains a return to organized violence in Nepal. Moreover, as noted in 
section 5.1.2, the political activity of many Nepali citizens is currently limited by 
the constant struggle for everyday basic necessities. Given this, the popular 
political agency referred to above may be more fruitfully conceived of as a latent 
potential, rather than as a manifest feature of popular activity in Nepal. 
Nonetheless, I argue that this is an interesting finding which warrants more in-
depth studies in Nepal and elsewhere on the role of popular political agency and 
awareness in restraining a return to civil war.
5.3 How do people in contemporary Nepal envision 
sustainable peace?
In this section I will begin to sketch the outlines of what everyday, post-liberal, 
peace in Nepal might entail, by focusing on the needs and perceptions of people in 
23  See: Mac Ginty 2008: 107.
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their everyday experiences of life in post-conflict Nepal. This is not intended to 
paint a complete picture of post-liberal peace in Nepal24, but should merely be 
taken as subjective expressions of ”imagined peace”25.
5.3.1 Visions of peace in Kathmandu
Several interlocutors in Kathmandu expressed the view that the current situation 
in Nepal should not in fact be called peace. While it was acknowledged that most 
large-scale violence had ended in the country, many of the interlocutors carried a 
sense that peace should entail more than that in order to qualify as real, or 
sustainable, peace. One of the main flaws of the current peace was identified as 
the general lack of improvement for people in their daily lives, as several 
interlocutors described how their everyday lives were consumed in a struggle for 
basic necessities such as water, food and fuel26. Accordingly, for most 
interlocutors sustainable peace entailed living in a society in which there is not a 
harsh struggle for basic resources.   
Furthermore, many interlocutors identified the fact that Nepal remains a 
structurally unequal society as one of the main obstacles to reaching sustainable 
peace. Interlocutor statements such as the following is indicative of this position: 
If people are mainstreamed, if people are considered as secondary citizens of a country, if 
citizens have to stay in a very remote part of the country so that they don't have the 
same opportunities […]. Such problems should be addressed in maintaining peace 
(Interview 6).
From this statement, one can discern a vision of peace which is informed by a 
conception of social justice. It expresses a concern that as long as people are 
24  In fact, any attempts at constructing a singular version of post-liberal peace would be antithetical to the basic 
assumptions of post-liberal peace understood as embracing and protecting difference. See: Richmond 2009: 568.
25 See: Mac Ginty 2008: 97-98.
26  This theme was further elaborated on in section 5.1.2. 
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treated differently and have unequal opportunities based on for example in which 
district of Nepal they live, there is not going to be sustainable peace in the 
country. 
Several interlocutors also noted that in order for sustainable peace to be built in 
Nepal, the political leaders must improve their ability to work together for a 
common purpose27. Thus, many interlocutors identified the need for a stable 
national political system based on democratic principles of cooperation and 
compromise as essential for building sustainable peace. As expressed by an 
interlocutor: ”The parties […] should come to consensus, all parties, in order to 
get a fresh mandate and to bring peace” (Interview 4). 
Moreover, several interlocutors held the opinion that in order to create peace, not 
only must the political leaders find a way of improving their democratic practices, 
but they must also decentralize some of their power to the district and local levels. 
The following statement of an interlocutor is indicative of this position: ”I think 
the major problem in Nepali politics is decentralization of power […] The power 
delivery to local level is essential, in my view” (Interview 6). This notion was 
articulated by multiple interlocutors, who saw decentralization of power as a 
means to address the structural inequalities in the country, and as such a transition 
towards a peace worthy of its name. This position contains an appreciation that 
peace can not be built solely from the top, but must also be anchored in local 
contexts and political structures.  
Finally, it was stressed by several interlocutors that in order for peacebuilding 
operations to be successful, the meaning of peace must be derived from the 
particular contexts in which it is to be built. For an ”outsider” to be able to 
understand peace in a local context, he or she must ”go to the places, talk to the 
people, see their lifestyle, and only then can you understand how they are affected 
by the environmental, economic, political situation” (Interview 1), as an 
interlocutor expressed it.
27  This issue was further elaborated on in sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1.
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5.3.2 Concluding discussion
The interlocutors that were interviewed for this study suggest that peace must be 
grounded in the everyday needs of people in post-conflict societies in order to be 
sustainable. This entails the desirability of designing peacebuilding operations that 
directly address these needs. As shown above, the interlocutors of this study focus 
much of their criticism of the current situation in Nepal on the low levels of 
everyday development for common people in Nepal, as well as the structural 
inequalities within the country. Given this, one might for example suggest that 
peacebuilding agencies increasingly take on the task of providing basic social 
welfare mechanisms in Nepal28. 
Moreover, several interlocutors highlighted the problems with the political culture 
in Nepal as a major obstacle to achieving sustainable peace, which could be taken 
as an argument for a more politically active role of international peacebuilding 
agencies in Nepali politics. However, at the same time many interlocutors 
expressed a strong hesitation about international involvement in the national 
politics of Nepal29. Therefore, the case for a more active political role of 
international peacebuilding agencies such as the UN does not seem to resonate 
well with the wishes of the interlocutors that were interviewed in this study. 
Instead, the post-liberal argument30 can be fruitfully made that international 
peacebuilding actors increasingly engage in reciprocal dialogue with local people 
in their everyday context, to better understand how support can be directed 
towards the political needs of these populations, without taking on an overly 
directive role.
28  This general argument is also made by Richmond 2009: 580.
29  As we saw in section 5.1.2.
30 See: Richmond 2009: 576, 579 and Richmond 2010: 691.
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6. Summary and concluding 
discussion
This thesis has argued that the contrasting perspectives on the Nepali peace 
process can largely be attributed to the disjuncture between the top-down 
technocratic perspective of the liberal peacebuilding approach on the one hand, 
and the bottom-up perspective of everyday experiences in post-conflict Nepal on 
the other. Moreover, it has been found that everyday life in Kathmandu is 
characterized by many of the distinguishing conditions of a "no war, no peace"-
society. Significantly however, there appears to be socio-cultural factors that 
currently restrain a return to civil war, as public optimism about the democratic 
and peaceful future of Nepal remains strong despite the adverse conditions of 
political and everyday life. Finally, it has been argued that sustainable peace in 
contemporary Nepal remains elusive to the common Nepali citizen, in the face of 
a lack of everyday development, national political progress, and socio-economic 
equality.    
Notwithstanding how positive the identification of potentially pacifying socio-
cultural factors in Nepal is, one should contemplate how these factors might be 
weakened by the "no war, no peace"-situation that many Nepali people are 
currently facing. Under these circumstances, I argue that it would be wise not to 
assume that these factors can place a permanent restraint on large-scale organized 
violence in the country. Thus, it should be ensured that current peacebuilding 
operations swiftly address the socio-economic and political grievances of the 
population in order to avoid the erosion of this pacifist momentum. As suggested 
in this thesis, international peacebuilding agencies could preferably engage in 
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comprehensive, perhaps selectively distributed, social welfare provision in Nepal. 
Additionally, it would be advisable that these agencies increasingly enter into 
reciprocal dialogue with local populations on how they might otherwise 
contribute to producing conditions for sustainable peace, rather than to continue 
working according to the liberal peace "blueprint". 
Although this study largely confirms the validity of Richmond's arguments about 
the need to move beyond traditional conceptions of the liberal peace, there are 
still some critical points to raise here. First of all – in terms of policy relevance, 
Richmond's conceptualization of post-liberal peace is per definition weak. This 
entails that studies in specific post-conflict societies need to be conducted in order 
for his arguments to have any bearing on concrete peace policy. Further, the post-
liberal peace framework can easily be (mis-)read as an idealization of the local 
population, which might prove problematic in the face of violence-prone or anti-
democratic local forces31. Although this reading is arguably not the intention of 
Richmond, a research agenda on post-liberal peace must engage critically with 
these issues in order not to become uncritically biased towards the local.       
In addition to the above, the research implications of this thesis are plentiful. First, 
more comprehensive studies should be conducted in order to substantiate and 
develop the findings of this preliminary study. Such studies would preferably 
involve a larger number of interlocutors, as well as cover broader geographic 
locations of Nepal. 
Secondly, one might fruitfully conceive of studies which seek to better understand 
what Mac Ginty refers to as conflict-restraining factors of a "subtle quality" 
(2008: 107) amongst the populace. What are the constitutive elements of these 
socio-cultural factors? How might it be possible to build upon these to expand and 
anchor them as part of a national pacifist culture? 
Finally, it is imperative to study how international peacebuilding actors could be 
made more receptive to local needs and to increasingly engage in dialogue with 
local populations in Nepal. The current research agenda on hybridity in relation to 
31 See: Donais 2009:12-13
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peacebuilding is promising in this regard32, however, it would gain from being 
complemented by more studies in specific post-conflict settings such as Nepal.
32 See for example: Richmond 2012 and Mac Ginty 2010b
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Annex 1
Interview Guide.
Topics to be covered during the interviews: 
1. Social identity and brief life story of the interlocutor.
2. Personal views and experiences of national politics since the first 
democratic movement in 1990 (Jana Andolan).
3. Personal views and experiences of the conflict between 1996-2006.
4. Personal views and experiences of the peacebuilding process that started in 
2006.
5. Personal reflections on life prior to and after the official Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in 2006. 
6. Final thoughts, critique, comments, and recommendations for the research.
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